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Abstract 
The social enterprise literature is dominated by stories of good practice and heroic 
achievement. Failure has not been widely researched. The limited policy and practice 
literature presents failure as the flipside of good practice. Explanations for failure are almost 
wholly individualistic, and related to poor governance. However, organisational studies 
literature shows that failure cannot be understood without reference to the wider environment 
within which organisations operate. This paper is based on a nine year in depth case-study of 
an organisation previously characterised in the policy and practitioner literature as an 
example of good practice and heroic achievement. We seek to explain its ‘failure’ through 
studying the interaction between the organisation and its wider environment. We show that 
simple individualistic explanations are not sufficient by which to understand social enterprise 
failure and outline the implications for academic understanding of social enterprise. 
Key words failure; social enterprise; third sector,  
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Introduction 
Enterprise Action (EA) began life in 1993 as a one-worker non-profit agency 
grounded in church and community group responses to the onset of mass redundancies in 
Steeltown.
 i
  In little more than a decade it had grown to a multi-project award-winning 
‘social enterprise’, visited publicly by two senior royals and the then Home Secretary.  Less 
than twelve months after the chief executive was awarded ‘regional social entrepreneur of the 
year’ (for the second time in three years), the collapse of the organisation into liquidation and 
closure was underway.  
Those researching social enterprise have tended to neglect the study of failure. A 
widespread enthusiasm for ‘good practice’ in the policy and academic literature has led to an 
over-emphasis on individuals (social entrepreneurs) and organisations (social enterprises) to 
the detriment of the wider environment within which they are situated. The utility of good 
practice accounts for organisational or academic learning is limited (Harvey et al, 2010). 
Studying cases of poor performance or failure may be more helpful to our understanding of 
organisations (Lindsley et al, 1995; Walshe et al, 2009).  
However there are methodological issues around researching failure. In the wider 
organisational failure literature researchers have tended to rely on analysis of large datasets 
charting business dissolutions, or the experiences of those managing failing organisations. 
The first approach is impossible for studying social enterprise failure as there are no reliable 
datasets, or even consensus as to the content and size of the sample population. (Teasdale et 
al, 2011).   The second approach is problematic as people tend to accentuate their own agency 
when describing success, and to over-emphasise the relevance of external factors when 
describing failure (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). Fortuitously in the case of EA, the lead 
author of this paper was immersed in the field as ‘failure’ unfolded as part of (what turned 
out to be) a nine year in-depth case study of social enterprise. Drawing upon this unique, 
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extended period of research access, this paper asks ‘what factors might be associated with the 
failure of EA?’ In particular, what are the implications for our understanding of social 
enterprise?  
The paper is structured as follows. First we draw upon the wider organisational 
literature to understand how organisational failure has been conceptualised and identify 
implications for researching social enterprise failure. We then introduce the case study 
organisation that forms the focus of this article, and describe the methods of data collection. 
This is followed by a case study charting the rise and fall of EA, paying particular attention to 
the events directly preceding and following the failure. Finally we return to the wider social 
enterprise literature to contextualise our findings and embed our contribution within this 
literature. 
Failure, social enterprise and the third sector 
Most organisations ‘fail’ (Ormerod, 2006). For some this may be temporary, and 
followed by turnaround (Paton and Mordaunt, 2004). For other organisations failure is 
absolute, and accompanied by liquidation (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). The ‘success 
rhetoric’ has tended to play a dominant role in organisational change literature, leading to the 
binary characterisation of cases as either successes or failures, and an endless search for 
common or unique success factors without recognising the complexities of social processes 
(Vaara, 2002).  
It is more difficult to conceptualise failure in the third sector as organisations have 
social goals but failure is socially constructed in economic terms (Mordaunt and Cornforth, 
2004). Most studies of social enterprise failure concern ‘mission drift’ rather than financial 
failure (see Dart, 2004). Although one of the largest studies of social enterprise in the United 
Kingdom highlighted high levels of financial failure, particularly in deprived areas (Amin et 
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al, 2002), there has not yet developed a coherent literature on the terminal financial failure of 
social enterprises.  
In a wide ranging review of the organisational failure literature, Mellahi and 
Wilkinson (2004) identified a broad split between ‘deterministic’ and ‘voluntarist’ 
explanations of failure. From within the deterministic school, institutional theory sees the 
organisation as embedded within its wider environment. Organisations draw their legitimacy 
and status (and hence resources) from their association with the field or industry in which 
they are situated (Baum and Oliver, 1992). These industries have a life cycle of their own. 
Organisations in a nascent industry will find it hard to attract resources and may be 
particularly prone to failure, but if the industry achieves legitimacy and grows, the 
organisation draws legitimacy through association and finds it easier to attract resources. 
Over time more organisations enter the industry, and new industries emerge in competition. 
Competition for resources increases, and again organisations are more prone to failure. So an 
organisation in a given industry is particularly prone to failure when population density is 
very low, or very high (Baum and Oliver, 1992).  
Although usually applied to industrial fields, a similar argument can be applied to the 
field of social enterprise. Thus, in addition to social enterprise failure rates being related to 
the industries in which they are located, they are also affected by changes in the field of 
social enterprise. Initial policy enthusiasm for social enterprise can be dated to the formation 
of Social Enterprise London in 1998, and its close links to decision makers within the  
Labour party (Teasdale, 2011). Subsequent to the neighbourhood renewal unit report 
Enterprise and Exclusion (HM Treasury, 1999), and particularly following the establishment 
of the Social Enterprise Unit within the Department of Trade and Industry in 2001, social 
enterprise can be seen to have achieved legitimacy as a way of delivering public goods. 
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Considerable financial resources flowed from government to organisations labelled as social 
enterprise over the next decade (Nicholls, 2010).  
From an institutional perspective one would expect that once the field had emerged, 
the small but growing number of self-identifying social enterprises would relatively easily 
access public resources by virtue of the wider legitimacy of social enterprise. Certainly the 
limited case-study evidence supports this view (Teasdale, 2010). The population density of 
self-identifying social enterprises has since increased dramatically (Lyon et al, 2010). From a 
resource dependency perspective (see Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003) if the share of public 
resources devoted to social enterprise failed to keep pace with this ‘growth’ one would expect 
the failure rate of social enterprises to rise, unless they were able to increase the proportion of 
their resources derived from private trading or from grants and donations.  
This perspective is helpful in understanding how social enterprise failure rates may 
change over time, but does not help us understand why some social enterprises in a given 
industry fail while others succeed. Statistical approaches have identified that small and / or 
newly established organisations are more likely to fail (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). 
Similarly we know that organisational failure rates vary geographically, the implication being 
that institutional environments are localised. Amin et al (2002) show that local political and 
economic circumstances play a major role in shaping local social economies. It is reasonable 
to suggest that social enterprise failure rates vary geographically. However there is still 
insufficient data to permit more detailed exploration (Buckingham et al, 2011).     
Whereas deterministic approaches see failure as primarily determined by industry or 
field, voluntaristic approaches place more emphasis on the role of boards and chief 
executives (Mellahi and Wilkinson, 2004). These approaches dominate the limited third 
sector failure literature. At their simplest they are the mirror image of the heroic success 
stories which dominate the early (business and management school) literature on social 
7 
 
enterprise (Nicholls and Young, 2008; Dey and Steyaert, 2010). The flipside of this heroic 
success has been characterised as delinquency or incompetency, the implication being that a 
properly-run organisation will not fail (Gibelman & Gelman, 2001).  
Although academic literature on social enterprise failure is conspicuous mainly by its 
absence (a small number of relevant studies are discussed later in this paper), the social 
enterprise policy and practitioner literature is dominated by tales of individual success stories. 
A report commissioned by the Scottish Government to help ‘establish the success factors for 
establishing a thriving social enterprise’ concludes the ‘traits’ of successful social enterprises 
are similar to those of private sector businesses. According to the authors: 
‘This reflects the fact that to be successful, social enterprises need to be successful 
businesses’ (Coburn and Rijsdijk, 2010 p9.) 
Their review of the literature suggested that where social enterprises do fail, this is often 
attributable to factors specific to the organisation. Thus failure is related to size, lack of 
resources, finance and funding issues, a lack of qualified staff, inadequate premises and cash 
flow difficulties (Coburn and Risdijk, 2010 p19). The lessons for organisational learning 
would seem to be: grow; bring in sufficient resources and qualified staff; acquire adequate 
premises; and ensure a strong cash flow. 
Of course conceptualising research into organisational failure necessarily involves 
oversimplification. Some academic accounts of failure focus on how organisations respond to 
changes in the wider environment in an attempt to go beyond the structure / agency dualism 
implied by determinist and voluntarist perspectives. For example, Mordaunt and Cornforth’s 
(2004) study of the role of nonprofit boards in responding to organisational crisis recognises 
that the causes of failure cannot be located solely in either the internal or external 
environment. Therefore researching failure necessitates exploring the interaction between the 
organisation and its wider environment.  
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Introducing the Case 
EA was established in May 1993 (See Table 1) as a church and community response 
to sudden mass unemployment in the dominant local industry. EA was a registered charity 
and a company limited by guarantee, incorporated in April 1998. Two of its `connected 
bodies` were companies limited by shares to act, respectively, as vehicles for sustainable 
trading and to hold and develop property. Other bodies were registered as different mixes of 
charity, company limited by guarantee and cooperatives.  
 Several key staff, including the chief executive (CE) and deputy shared professional 
backgrounds in youth work. Local churches were one of the main sources of the six to eight 
board members and reinforced a strong commitment to a social mission.  The original 
elements of this social mission were to enable young people to ‘take their places as valued 
contributing members of the community’, and to assist young people ‘into full employment’ 
(EA Annual Report 1993-4). 
The first fully EA-led project began in 1995. Thereafter, rapid growth took place, with 
a furniture workshop, provision for the homeless, catering training, and environmental 
activities forming the main activities. In April 1997 a total income, of £80,000 from twenty 
two sources, supported two or three workers and equipment for a furniture workshop. By 
August 31st 1998 the income had risen to £400,000. The existing mix of grants from 
charitable trusts and local authorities was complemented by four European grants totalling 
£325,000.  
Overall income and the revenue mix remained stable for the next three years. In 2001-
2002 a grant of £350,000 from the then Department for Education and Science increased 
overall income to over £750,000. In September 2003, a grant of £1.3 million was awarded by 
the Heritage Lottery Fund (and paid over the following three years), for the restoration of a 
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nineteenth century hall to serve as a community hub as well as the home for previously 
dispersed EA projects. At this time the CE and deputy aided by between eight and ten 
administrative and managerial staff coordinated up to thirty project workers.  
Also in 2003 expenditure overtook income (which fell to £550,000). The 2002-03 
Annual report set out a five year goal of achieving ‘seventy percent self-sufficiency.’ At best, 
self-sufficiency (trading income) from sales of furniture and contracts with secondary 
schools, social services departments and the Probation service never accounted for more than 
25% of total annual income, and EA’s total funds (assets minus liabilities) declined in each 
subsequent year.  At the end of the five-year period, the CE and deputy had been arrested 
following allegations (later found unproven) of financial irregularities and EA had been 
liquidated following ‘a pattern of loss making activities, significant creditor liabilities and a 
lack of robust accounting systems’ (Directors report to creditors, 2007.) This would appear a 
simple description of managerial and governance failure. However an academic report into 
social enterprise in Steeltown emphasised that any evaluation of success or failure needed to 
look beyond specific organisational policy and practice. Steeltown was allegedly ‘different’ 
because of ‘geographic isolation, industrial history, demographics and collapse of community 
support groups’ (Simmill-Binning, 2007: 9.) 
Steeltown 
During the lifetime of EA, Steeltown consistently experienced declines in 
employment particularly in the very large manufacturing company that dominated the local 
economy.  Male unemployment at the time of EA’s collapse was more than three times the 
national average, yet both the Labour-controlled local authority and the large corporate 
employer demonstrated their own failures to adjust to inherently complex economic and 
social problems. 
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From the early 1990s, the LA attempted to bend job creation and regeneration towards 
the poorest.  Yet its 1999 strategic plan announced that it had only just begun to prepare a 
borough-wide strategy for community-based economic development. Three years later, one 
of the consultancies hired to facilitate these initiatives concluded (as part of its evaluation of a 
£5.6 million Single Regeneration Budget) that, despite the declared commitment to the 
voluntary and community sectors, there was no common agreement on what constituted a 
community enterprise; the creation of new jobs within the third sector was very limited; and 
the ‘hard to reach’ were not being reached (interview with Steeltown principal strategy and 
regeneration officer, November 2002).  
As well as this failure of the local state, there were also signs of market failure in 
Steeltown.  As EA entered liquidation, the largest employer in the town was reported as being 
four years late and £1 billion over budget on its latest construction project (National paper, 
May 2007). An article in the local newspaper cited an Institute for Public Policy Research 
report showing that Steeltown had only 155 VAT registered enterprises per 10,000 
population, as compared to a national average 306 per 10,000 population. By way of 
comparison the worst performing area in the UK, South Tyneside had 128 enterprises per 
10,000 population (Local paper, January 2007).  
To complete a brief review of Steeltown’s sectors, mention must be made of EA’s 
peers in the third sector.  It would appear that social enterprise inter-organisational 
relationships were ‘weak’ (Simmill-Binning, 2007). The LA’s 1999 strategic plan noted that:  
‘…there is much evidence that this sector is under-developed.  According to the rule 
of thumb adopted by the Community Development Foundation, Steeltown should 
have about 180 community groups or organisations – the actual figure is probably half 
that.’  
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As EA neared complete liquidation, a major infrastructure organisation went into 
administration amidst inquiries into financial irregularities and the local social enterprise 
network concluded its three-year (£600k) programme by announcing it had established only 
20 new jobs.  
It would seem then that Steeltown was a place where the ‘transformative potential’ of 
social enterprise to regenerate communities was much needed (see HM Treasury, 1999), but 
that the local economic and political conditions conducive to a thriving social economy 
(Amin et al, 2002) were conspicuously lacking. 
Methods 
Prior to financial collapse the lead author had been researching EA for five years as 
part of two overlapping research projects. In the first instance EA had formed one of the 
cases in a major national study exploring the relevance of social enterprise to the voluntary 
and community sector (reported in Pharoah et al, 2004). Cases were selected as examples of 
‘successful’ social enterprises as defined by their peers. Data was collected through 
interviews conducted with core managerial and administrative staff (six individuals on 
several occasions), three project staff, and a trustee, and observations of day to day (and less 
usual) activities. Documentary data collected (and used for this paper) included annual 
reports, local newspapers, promotional material, and accounts. External interviewing 
involved three local authority officers and a worker from the Development Trusts 
Association. Key themes deriving from the data were the relationship between organisational 
structures and values; tensions between social and economic goals and the consequences of 
these tensions. 
A follow up study conducted in 2005 (reported in Russell and Scott, 2007) explored 
tensions between social and economic objectives with particular reference to organisational 
learning. Here data was collected through intensive interviewing of the CE and deputy, and a 
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middle manager who has acted as informal research gatekeeper over almost a decade. All 
were interviewed twice. Further documentary materials were collected. Key themes explored 
in this study were the perceived strengths and weaknesses of current developmental activity, 
and tensions between ‘traditional approaches’ and experiential emphases to learning. 
Although the studies were not designed to study failure, the data collected has been 
retrospectively repurposed.  
The third (unfunded) phase of research arose because of, and focused explicitly on, 
the failure of EA. The earlier research gave the lead author a unique insight into the 
background to EAs collapse and a unique opportunity for research access. Freed from the 
constraints of funded research and from the obligations of field research (where negative 
critiques may be modified to preserve relationships), this phase of research developed a 
greater emphasis on the wider political and economic environment. The primary aim was 
develop an understanding of why EA failed. However, following closure of EA, access to 
data was necessarily uneven. Neither the CE nor the deputy agreed to be interviewed. 
Therefore nearly all contact centred on the former gatekeeper. Data collection was mostly 
informal over a four year period. The gatekeeper regularly sent EA documents and press 
cuttings, and regular email contact occurred. This was supplemented by biannual meetings, or 
informal interviews. Once the liquidation process had been completed, the individual 
professional who had worked with EA over a number of years, and who had been acting on 
EA`s behalf as an `undertaker`, agreed to a sequence of telephone discussions and interviews. 
These eventually led to a formal interview in September 2011. Here a topic checklist was 
agreed in advance as preparation for a two hour recorded interview. This included issues 
around why EA failed, the Community Hall project and the processes of liquidation. The 
transcript was then discussed via email and telephone conversations. 
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In total 35 formal interviews and many more informal exchanges were conducted over 
the three research phases. The approach to analysis has been mainly inductive and has 
involved the collection of different explanations for failure from media reporting and those 
provided by the gatekeeper. Making sense of these explanations involved developing an 
understanding of the academic and policy literature pertaining to social enterprise failure, and 
following advice from peers, the wider organisational failure literature. These explanations 
were then discussed and refined by the two authors and initial conclusions presented to 
research participants. Following ongoing dialogue between the lead author and research 
gatekeeper these explanations were further refined and presented to the EA ‘undertaker’. This 
process continued until some approximation of a shared understanding was reached. The 
following section outlines this shared understanding. It is necessarily linear in form, when of 
course the reality was much messier and involved continually re-visiting emergent concepts 
(explanations of failure), data and academic literature.  
Why did EA fail? 
Analysis of financial data released after the liquidation process reveals that EA had 
been spending more than it had been receiving from around 2003. It would appear that while 
income was falling EA failed to sufficiently reduce costs to accommodate the shortfall. 
Moreover it would seem that EA had been cross subsidising projects with grants earmarked 
for other projects. At first glance this points to a simple story of financial incompetence. 
However a wider understanding of the circumstances concerning the ‘rise and fall’ of EA 
demonstrates a simple individualistic story of management and governance failure is an 
insufficient explanation for failure.  
Impression Management and the rise of EA 
EA’s rapid growth occurred over a period of time when the local area was desperate 
for success stories to counteract the wider economic gloom caused in part by the decline in 
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employment by the dominant local employer, and overlapped with the initial policy interest 
in social enterprise. EA was regularly mentioned in regional and national newspapers and the 
national social enterprise press during this period. The community hub project was officially 
launched by a high profile member of the royal family. The media covered visits to EA by the 
then Home Secretary, while EA was held up as an example of social enterprise good practice 
in at least two high-profile government publications, as well as in national newspapers and 
publications by national social enterprise support organisations.  
It would appear that the CE was making the most of his links to the royal family and 
local landed gentry to generate publicity. According to a national newspaper: ‘EA’s good 
reputation feeds its momentum’ (May, 2001). Perhaps the legitimacy conferred by official 
visits from the royal family and government assisted with grant applications at a time when 
many funding bodies were keen to be associated with ‘successful’ social enterprises?  
It was sometimes claimed that EA had misused the mass local redundancies as a way 
of gaining grants. According to one local political actor EA ‘rode on the back of ten thousand 
redundancies for too many years and got away with it’. The implication being that subsequent 
outputs were not able to match any original claims concerning its proposed responses to 
unemployment. Even if such a criticism were partly true, it should be noted that no local 
agency, whether state, commercial or third sector, has been able to make responses of an 
appropriate scale to match these problems. 
A consistent strategy? 
A study of the successful grant applications revealed few signs of a coherent strategy. 
It would appear that applications were sent to almost anybody likely to fund EA. Grants were 
for new and seemingly unconnected projects, for example a furniture workshop, to redevelop 
a community hall, a catering facility, a cycle repair shop, and a ‘portfolio of environmental 
action’. However a common thread links all these applications. In each case grant funding 
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was supplied to help EA develop a sustainable business. Perhaps these were the unwritten 
rules of the game? Funders may be desperate for success stories so organisations like EA 
construct them. Rarely was close attention paid to the detail of the grant applications. In most 
cases EA supplied a ‘business plan’. But according to one interviewee: ‘business plans were 
written not to take you somewhere, but to justify a funding bid’. And EA usually delivered on 
promises to funders – each of the various projects was set up eventually.  
It later became clear that reporting strategies for external audiences and administrative 
processes for internal coordination systematically demonstrated high degrees of fluidity. In 
1998 the first strategic plan listed twelve projects. Three years later this total had apparently 
risen to 18 projects with 102 employees.  However it proved difficult to locate all these 
projects during the first phase of the research. An interim report (Scott, 2003) identified 
‘enthusiastic reporting’, whereby a project became listed whether it was active; ‘temporarily 
inactive’; or even if it had recently closed.  One year later, subsequent employee interviews 
identified that, of twenty listed projects, only eleven were actually active. When questioned 
on these features, the CE suggested that this was ‘normal’ practice in organisations such as 
EA: 
‘If you`re going to challenge people, be socially inclusive and so on, then you`ve got 
to have something like this `pre-historic swamp` as a seed-bed to grow these things. 
That means it has to be uneasy, uncomfortable, not contrivedly so...by its very nature’ 
(cited in Pharoah et al, 2004: 47). 
However according to the EA ‘undertaker’ interviewed in 2011, funders were effectively 
paying for the previous project, and contractors were consistently paid late. The EA strategy 
sometimes seemed to be act first and then seek a grant to pay for it later.  
The rules of the game? 
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A world whereby grants for new projects cross-subsidised existing projects and 
creditors were paid late seems evidence of financial incompetence. How did EA get into this 
situation? One example suggests again that this may have been the rules of the game in which 
EA was involved.   EA was commissioned to deliver various social fund contracts. However 
the failure of the government regional agency to pay on time caused early cash-flow 
problems which, if addressed earlier, might have made some difference to the eventual failure 
of EA. For example,  
‘… the £180k (approx) owed by the Government Regional Agency for completed 
Social Fund contracts during 1999 – 2001.  After nine audits and dealing with twenty 
three desk officers, some of the money was paid in 2006, by then it was too late’ 
(Interview with EA gate-keeper, 1/5/08). 
It would appear that early in the life of EA the CE had to adapt to a world where grants and 
contract payments arrived late. Rather than borrow from banks to cover short (or longer) term 
cash flow problems, the response according to one interviewee was to adopt this ‘smoke and 
mirrors approach.’  
A community hub too far? 
The CE continued his previously ‘successful’ strategy of bringing in new grants to 
pay for projects. In 2003 he had his most high profile success. The CE was made aware 
through his social networks that Steeltown had received comparatively less lottery funding 
than similar towns, and a bid would be looked upon favourably. Again a business plan was 
hastily developed, to rent out space to community groups and provide a single home to EA’s 
different projects. A £1.3 million grant from the Heritage National Lottery Fund  
 was secured to purchase and redevelop a listed building as a community hub. Whereas 
previously it was possible to cross subsidise projects and hide financial difficulties, a single 
grant of £1.3 million concentrated risk. While the community hub was developed more or 
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less on time, further funding had to be secured to finish the development, and two grant 
making trusts secured a charge against the building, effectively meaning it could not be sold 
by EA. The community hub was officially completed at the end of 2005 and opened in 2006.  
In 2006 the CE was awarded ‘regional social entrepreneur of the year’. Although not 
then in the public domain, the ‘accounts’ show that in the previous financial year EA`s total 
funds had fallen from £165,000 to less than £10,000. In an ominous media interview in 
December 2006, the CE noted that ‘delivering training on a budget like ours is a constant 
challenge.’  
What was not reported was that the CE was involved in a battle with his trustees at the 
time, which saw the CE suspended in early January 2007. Later that month the CE resigned, 
and on the same day the three remaining board members also resigned. A later report to the 
creditors revealed that at the time EA had accumulated financial losses of almost £500,000. 
This did not include the £1.7 million of charges on the community centre, but did include 
£150,000 of loans taken out by the CE and deputy and secured on their houses (which they 
subsequently forfeited) to keep EA afloat. 
Poor Governance 
The board of trustees may not have had the financial skills or time necessary to 
recognise any problems. Moreover, according to interviewees, the CE found it difficult to 
devolve control (whether upwards or downwards). One explanation of EA’s subsequent 
failure is, therefore, that it’s administrative and governance structures had not been 
sufficiently developed to meet the demands of its period of expansion and transition to a 
social enterprise. Perhaps replacing the entrepreneurial CE with somebody better equipped to 
develop organisational systems and processes might have averted failure? But this 
explanation also ignores the wider context within which EA was situated.  
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First, there may not have been sufficiently skilled individuals in Steeltown willing to 
join the board of trustees. Certainly it proved difficult to attract suitably qualified staff to 
manage the various projects in a paid capacity. To some extent the CE sought to compensate 
for this by paying for professional advice. But as noted by a ‘rescue worker’ sent from the 
Development Trusts Association, the quality of local professional advice was poor. Indeed in 
one example EA paid a recruitment agency £7,000 for recruiting a Finance Officer, who was 
subsequently unable to gain sufficient access to the information held by the CE. Second, who 
would have decided the timing of replacing the entrepreneurial CE? It is difficult even with 
the benefit of hindsight to pick a moment in time when the CEs skills were no longer 
appropriate.  
A new board was appointed at the end of January 2007. In early February the local 
newspaper reported that the CE and deputy had been arrested in connection with financial 
irregularities, and that on the same day tax officials had announced they would take EA to the 
High Court. Following legal advice that EA was technically insolvent the new board (aided 
by the Development Trusts Association) began a search for ways of keeping EA projects 
alive. Analysis of this search sheds new light on the relationship between EA and its wider 
environment.  
External environment 
The local authority had been criticised in an academic report as ‘unhelpful to social 
enterprises’ (Simmill-Binning, 2007). However it had previously donated a small terraced 
house and small sums (usually less than £10,000) to EA but felt unable to offer practical help 
to save the community hub. According to an interviewee involved in the ‘rescue process’ the 
local authority had previously ‘rescued’ a local charitable trust and were not prepared to be 
seen as lender of last resort to the third sector. Additionally the local authority had recently 
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been through a very public scandal involving their management of one of their own 
buildings. Perhaps as elected politicians they were not prepared to take on further risk.  
Another explanation for the local authority refusing to help EA provided by one 
interviewee was that the CE was seen as ‘upper class’ with links to the royal family whereas 
the local authority was Labour controlled and had grown from hierarchies and union 
solidarities linked to the dominant employer. The CE had previously not established 
consistently strong links with the local authority and preferred to draw upon existing social 
networks to attract funding from elsewhere: 
‘I think they (policy makers and politicians) regard us with suspicion, possibly as 
threatening because we don’t necessarily work in traditional ways. We’re relatively 
uncontrollable because of our extra-local resourcing’ (CE, cited in Scott, 2003.) 
It is likely that these networks beyond Steeltown were as much symbolic as the source of 
continuing finance and could not be easily drawn upon during the high-profile investigations. 
It should be noted that no evidence of financial irregularities was uncovered during the 
subsequent police investigation. 
Sustainability of projects 
EA may never have got into debt if the various projects funded had become 
financially sustainable. But most of EAs projects never became sustainable. Perhaps they 
were ill-advised from the start? Certainly a plan to train unemployed people in catering and 
win a contract to supply all the school meals in the area seems a little ambitious with 
hindsight. But the business plans certainly appeared viable to those funding EA. We suspect 
this relates to a desire to believe in social enterprise generally, and in particular that EA could 
be successful in turning round the labour market in a deprived town. 
Given the systemic limitations of state, market and third sector in Steeltown, the 
financial collapse of EA might have been more easily predicted. However, a singular focus 
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on the eventual financial failure of EA necessarily neglects successes during its lifespan. The 
research upon which this paper draws did not attempt to evaluate the social or economic 
outputs of EA. Nonetheless, it is worth adding here that a positive legacy of EA was the 
emergence of eight micro-businesses employing at least 20 people. That is more jobs than 
were created by the aforementioned social enterprise network. This of course does not 
include the people employed or placed into employment by EA during its lifetime.  
Some people employed by EA might reasonably be expected to have negative 
opinions of the former CE. However, buried deep in the letters pages of the local newspaper, 
testimonies from former staff can be found:  
‘I was given an opportunity to set up and deliver a project to support young people 
who were struggling and lost their way in life. The young people kept coming back 
for more and over a five-year period I supported more than 300 young people, 
teaching them culinary skills and raising their self-esteem and hope for the future. All 
this piece of magic took place thanks to [EA]. [the CE and deputy] are two of the 
most caring and loving people I have ever come across. I would like to thank [the CE 
and deputy] for their support and wish them every success’ (Local paper, May 2008.)  
The eventual failure of EA also gave rise to significant opportunities for others.  The 
liquidators charged a fee of £80,000. By the end of 2008 the community hub had been sold at 
a London auction for £110,000.  Eight months later the first property developer sold the 
building on to a second developer for £500,000, whilst remaining in place as the manager of 
the building.  A public asset, which represented huge investments of public money, low paid 
employee and volunteer energy, had not been retained for public use.  A final postscript came 
from the local newspaper.  One local charity and former tenant felt the double-sale of the hall 
to be ‘disgusting’, whilst an estate agent concluded ‘you have to admire the people that 
bought it because they made a fantastic investment.’ 
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This case presents a number of nascent explanatory perspectives on social enterprise 
failure which give rise to four particular questions in particular. First, was EA ever a social 
enterprise, at least as characterised in the policy and academic discourses of financially 
sustainable businesses trading for a social purpose? Second, while the CE and board were 
clearly competent at managing impressions in order to secure grant funding, were they 
sufficiently competent to financially manage a growing enterprise? Third, how realistic was it 
to expect a social enterprise to succeed in creating employment in a deprived area at a time 
when the major private sector employer and local authority were failing to achieve this 
objective? Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, are financial and social success perhaps 
mutually exclusive goals in places such as Steeltown? Of course a single case is an 
insufficient basis on which to generate firm conclusions. But, our case study does provide the 
opportunity to extend the existing literature on failing social enterprises.   
What are the implications for our understanding of social enterprise? 
‘The only crime [the CE and deputy] committed was ruling with their hearts instead 
of using their business management skills’ (Former employee, Local paper, July 
2008.) 
This article can be only a modest first step towards a more detailed understanding that takes 
fully into account the social, economic and political landscapes across which social 
enterprises must operate, these landscapes being wider and deeper than single organisations. 
It will always be important to construct an ecology of influences and interactions when 
seeking to explain and respond to different dimensions of failure. This necessarily 
complicates the picture. As our case has shown, once the wider ecology is introduced it is no 
longer sufficient to say, for example, that EA failed because of poor governance or financial 
incompetence. 
The policy literature presents a simplified picture of social enterprise as: 
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‘a business with primarily social/environmental objectives, whose surpluses are 
principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or community rather than 
mainly being paid to shareholders and owners’ (DTI, 2002: 8). 
This definition implicitly assumes that, as businesses, their financial sustainability derives 
from trading to generate surpluses, as distinct from their grant-dependent cousins in the 
voluntary and community sector.  
EA never derived more than a quarter of its annual income through trading, though it 
did describe itself as a social enterprise. Perhaps this is evidence of delinquency or 
incompetence? However, EA was not alone in claiming to be a social enterprise. Secondary 
analysis of the 2008/09 National Survey of Third Sector Organisations data found that 48% 
of third sector organisations claimed to fit the DTI social enterprise definition, equating to 
around 82,000 organisations. Few of these received more than half their income through 
trading (Lyon et al, 2010). There appears to be a stark distinction between the image of social 
enterprises presented in the policy literature, and the ‘reality’ on the ground (Parkinson and 
Howorth, 2008). While social enterprises may be presented as sustainable businesses, for 
most the reality is more akin to that faced by EA, a constant struggle to bring in income 
through a mix of trading and grants (Amin et al, 2002) in order to mitigate the effects of 
social, economic and political change (Dey and Steyaert, 2010).   
Indeed, usage of the title social enterprise may be a deliberate strategy to attract grant 
funding. For example, a study by Teasdale (2010) found that a manager of one organisation 
selectively used the term social enterprise to attract grant funding from resource holders. 
Certainly EA’s income increased dramatically following the adoption of the label social 
enterprise by themselves and by infrastructure bodies keen to be associated with this 
supposedly new and innovative approach to tackling social problems.  
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But self-presenting as a social enterprise in order to attract grant funding may not be a 
sustainable funding approach in the long term. A study of failure in social enterprises by 
Seanor and Meaton (2008) found that all actors in the four cases studied utilised this 
chameleon-like nature to draw upon financial resources available to organisations that were 
presented as social enterprises. However, the failure of some cases was attributable in part to 
resource holders starting to believe the social enterprise rhetoric and pushing organisations 
away from grant funding without recognising that they could not hope to be sustainable from 
commercial revenue alone (Seanor and Meaton, 2008).  
Amin et al. (2002) note the difficulties for many social enterprises in generating 
sufficient commercial revenue to be financially sustainable over time. They argue 
convincingly that areas marked by social exclusion are unable to sustain a thriving social 
economy. A supportive political environment can help counter-balance a lack of market 
opportunities through the provision of grants or contracts to deliver government services. But 
again, as we have seen, the political environment at the local level in Steeltown was not 
consistently conducive to the development of local social enterprises and third sector 
organisations. 
This raises the question as to whether social enterprises in areas such as Steeltown 
could ever hope to succeed as sustainable businesses while maintaining a commitment to 
social goals. The more critical academic literature would suggest not. Dart’s (2004) inductive 
case study of ‘Community Service Organization’ (CSO) - a Canadian nonprofit trying to 
become more ‘business like’ - found that there were inherent tensions between social and 
commercial objectives across several programmes. For example, provision of financial 
counselling to people with mental health problems was abandoned as it could not be made 
commercially viable. This tension between social and economic objectives is not unique to 
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CSO, but rather may be seen occurring across a wide range of social enterprises (See for 
example; Russell and Scott, 2007; Seanor and Meaton, 2008).  
Indeed, it may be that those social enterprises which ‘succeed’ – that is become 
sustainable through trading - are those that move away from their original social values and 
goals (Amin et al, 2002; Dart, 2004). EA’s failure might plausibly have been a consequence 
of its failing to prioritise economic considerations over and above social goals, especially 
given its social, economic and political environment. Rather than reduce expenditure (and 
social outputs) as a response to declining income in 2003, EA sought to cover any shortfall 
through ‘borrowing’ from future grant income. Other studies of social enterprises also 
suggest that attempting to tread a more pro-social approach to balancing social and 
commercial considerations might be a cause of financial failure (Tracey and Jarvis, 2006, 
2007; Twersky and Lanzerotti, 1999).  
Thus, many organisations termed ‘social enterprises’ face an inherent tension between 
their twin objectives, in that their social and enterprise (i.e. economic) goals might not be 
reconcilable (Blackburn and Ram, 2006; Mozier and Tracey, 2010). This in-built 
contradiction might be recognised and actively managed, but it is rarely sufficiently 
harmonised to achieve sustainability over the long term. When chief executives of social 
enterprises describe themselves as `chameleons` they may be attempting to articulate perhaps 
the most crucial dimension of their role. That is the need to constantly develop an 
understanding of the size, shape and dynamics of their operating environment, and then 
respond creatively to the changes within it. 
Where there is an acceptance that complexity and contradiction are recurrent elements 
in social enterprise then the systems for training and support can be re-shaped accordingly. 
When organisational failure is identified as likely to reflect structural features of at least 
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partially failing towns, economies and civil societies then social enterprise actors can become 
both more realistic about their fears and yet more ambitious about their hopes. 
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Table 1. The rise and fall of EA (1993-2010) 
Dates Notable High and Low Points. 
1993 May EA established as a response to mass unemployment. 
June First paid worker appointed (later became Chief Executive). 
1995  First independent projects established. 
1998 
 
 Strategic plan listed 11 projects. 
April 
 
Registered as Company Limited by Guarantee. 
 
 May Date of charity registration. 
2000  18 projects listed, with 102 employees. First royal visit. 
2002 June Received £400,000 grant to establish furniture workshop. 
2003 April Second royal visit. Chief Executive received MBE and awarded 
‘Regional Social Entrepreneur of the year’. Community Hall Project 
launched. 
October Visited by Home Secretary. 
2004-
2006 
 Mounting losses. Non-payment of VAT, but this information not 
placed in public domain until early 2007. 
2006  Chief Executive awarded ‘Regional Social Entrepreneur of the year’ 
for a second time. 
2006-
07 
November 
- January 
Suspension followed by resignation of Chief Executive. Police 
investigation launched. 
2007 April EA enters liquidation. 
2008 July Closure of community hall, later sold to a property developer. 
2010 February Liquidation process finalised. 
 
                                                          
i
 Enterprise Action and Steeltown are pseudonyms. The case study organisation has been 
disguised in order to protect the identity of informants. Newspaper articles and research 
reports which would identify the case study organisation have been disguised.  
